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Abstract 
This article examines the historical, doctrinal and theoretical bases of share-
holder rights in British company law. These rights are, and always have been, 
essentially the product of private bargains, subjected to regulation of various 
explicit and implicit forms. This legal framework has significant normative 
advantages: it facilitates the development of innovative and efficient corporate 
structures. That is demonstrated through empirical evidence and examples from 
British corporate practice. One key example is how so-called ‘indirect investors’ 
in a company – the large and economically significant group of people who invest 
in a company through intermediaries such as nominees and depositaries – can be 
accommodated within the governance structure of the company, even though they 
are not themselves shareholders in the company and so are not directly party to 
its internal governance mechanisms. With this domestic legal background in 
mind, the article finally addresses and assesses the impact and effect of the 
proposed EU Shareholder Rights Directive on British company law and practice. 
 
Keywords: company, share, shareholder, indirect investor, corporate structure, 
corporate governance, shareholder rights, corporate history, corporate theory, 
European company law, British company law, corporate practice. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Draft Shareholder Rights Directive1 proposes various Community-wide 
fundamental rights for shareholders.2 The Commission proposes to enshrine these 
rights in a Directive applicable across the European Union because of the growth 
—————————————————— 
1 COM (2005) 685 final (hereinafter, ‘the Directive’). 
2 Strictly speaking, rights in a British company attach to members of the company, that is, 
(in a company limited by shares) those shareholders whose names are on the company’s 
register of members. See, most importantly, Companies Act 1985, ss. 14 and 22. In this article, 
the terms ‘shareholder’ and ‘member’ are used interchangeably, because someone who 
becomes a shareholder in a listed company will be placed on the company’s register of 
members. 
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in cross-border ownership of securities and the difficulties in exercising rights 
attached to those securities. The very opening paragraph of the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Draft Directive sets out the issues succinctly and bears 
repetition in full. 
 
Shareholder participation is an essential precondition for effective corporate 
governance. However, EU-citizens holding shares in a listed company situated 
in another Member State often face severe problems when they wish to exer-
cise the voting rights attaching to these shares and sometimes even encounter 
obstacles that make voting practically impossible. Nowadays, investors typi-
cally hold their shares through accounts opened with securities intermediaries, 
who, in turn, hold accounts with other securities intermediaries and central 
securities depositories in other jurisdictions. The legal constructs from which 
shareholders’ rights emanate in the Member States are not always fully 
adapted to this modern form of intermediated holdings. The cross-border 
chains of intermediaries, therefore, make not only the communication process 
between issuers and shareholders, but also the voting process, more difficult.3 
 
The Directive does not, however, unify the structures for shareholder governance 
within companies incorporated under the national laws of a Member State. That 
would be an immensely difficult task, given the very different legal and commer-
cial traditions within the European Union. Indeed, it would be difficult to the 
point of inhibiting any useful development of shareholder rights at the Commu-
nity level. Instead, the Directive builds on existing structures by insisting on 
certain minimum rights for shareholders, irrespective of how shareholders’ rights 
are constituted in a company incorporated under the national laws of a particular 
Member State.4 
Consequently, in order to understand the impact and implementation of the 
Directive in any given state, it is necessary to understand how the national laws of 
that state approach the question of shareholder rights. This article focuses on the 
impact of the Directive in the United Kingdom, or, more precisely, its impact on 
companies incorporated in Great Britain under the Companies Act 1985.5 
The article will first explain the legal underpinnings of shareholder rights in 
Britain. These rights are fundamentally contractual, established by bargain between 
the shareholders in a company, and the rights are correspondingly variable, 
notwithstanding that their contractual basis has been subject to considerable 
—————————————————— 
3 Explanatory Memorandum to the Directive, para. 1.1. 
4 The Directive is, by virtue of Art. 3, avowedly a minimum harmonisation directive. 
5 Companies are incorporated in Northern Ireland under the Companies (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1986 (SI 1986/1032) which very largely follows the Companies Act 1985. 
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mandatory, statutory, regulation over the years.6 This article will demonstrate why 
that essentially contractual régime remains important to this day, both for general 
reasons of legal theory and practice and for the specific purpose of implementing 
the Directive in the United Kingdom. Next, the article will examine the particular 
problem of those who, in the United Kingdom, are termed ‘indirect investors’, that 
is, those who invest in shares, but who have the registered title to the shares held for 
them by an intermediary, often a bank or other institution acting as a nominee or 
depositary. Though the right to vote shares in a British company attaches to the 
registered holder of shares, practising lawyers have adapted existing legal institu-
tions – the right to cast votes by means of a proxy – to ensure some considerable 
measure of enfranchisement for indirect investors.7 These techniques will soon be 
supplemented by legislation, namely Part 9 of the Companies Bill, which is 
currently before the UK Parliament. Finally, and with this understanding in mind, 
the article will assess the impact of the Directive in the United Kingdom. 
 
 
2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS IN BRITAIN 
 
Anyone who wishes to understand shareholder rights in British companies must 
be aware of history. A common law system is the product of history: a system of 
precedent is necessarily historical. Statute law in such a system might seem less 
beholden to history, because Parliament can write legislation afresh. Appearances 
are deceptive, however. In the United Kingdom, statutes are often re-enactments 
of previous legislation: a new Act of Parliament brings together (‘consolidates’) 
in one Act several previous Acts related to a single topic, and then repeals the old 
legislation. The new ‘consolidating’ Act has the same effect as the old legislation, 
unless Parliament indicated through the language of the Act that the law was to 
change.8 Companies legislation in the United Kingdom follows this pattern. 
 
2.1 The basis in history 
 
The earliest UK companies legislation in a recognisably modern form was the 
Companies Act 1862, though that Act itself drew to an extent on earlier legislation, 
—————————————————— 
6 This part of the article draws on the author’s earlier and fuller examination of shareholder 
rights in English law, see R.C. Nolan, ‘The Continuing Evolution of Shareholder Governance’, 
65(1) Cambridge Law Journal (2006) p. 92. 
7 This part of the article draws on the author’s earlier and fuller examination of indirect 
investors’ rights in English law, see R.C. Nolan, ‘Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the 
Company?’, 3 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2003) p. 73. 
8 As to the interpretation of consolidating Acts, see, e.g., Grey v. IRC [1960] A.C. 1; and, 
more generally, F. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 4th edn. (London, Butterworths 2002) pp. 
515-518. 
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in particular the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. Over time, Parliament 
amended the 1862 Act and added to it, before all the relevant law was consoli-
dated in the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908. The cycle of amendment, 
addition and consolidation has since been repeated three times, culminating in 
(respectively) the Companies Act 1929, the Companies Act 1948 and the Compa-
nies Act 1985. 
The 1985 Act is now the central piece of legislation which governs how the 
overwhelming majority of business corporations are formed and run in the United 
Kingdom. Since its enactment, the 1985 Act has itself been much altered and 
expanded. Other subsequent Acts also affect the constitution and operation of 
companies established in the United Kingdom. Indeed, yet another such Act will 
appear when the Companies Bill passes through Parliament and obtains the Royal 
Assent. 
Be that as it may, the important point for understanding shareholder rights in 
Britain is that their basic structure was established in our earliest company law, 
and, notwithstanding a heavy body of regulation enacted subsequently, that basic 
structure still endures. That is why a survey of history is important for the 
purposes of this article. 
The Companies Act 1862 said nothing about the rights of control shareholders 
were to have in a company. Indeed, it contained just five sections which specifi-
cally concerned how shareholders were generally to run their affairs within a 
company. 
Section 49 of the 1862 Act, the opening section in a division headed ‘Provi-
sions for Protection of Members’, required that a company was to have a general 
(i.e., shareholders’) meeting each year.9 Section 52 laid down four default rules to 
regulate the calling and conduct of general meetings, though these rules only 
applied in so far as a company’s articles of association (constitution) made no 
other relevant provision.10 Sections 53-54 required the registration and publication 
of ‘special resolutions’,11 as defined in section 51.12 Finally, section 67 required 
minutes of any meetings to be kept, provided for such minutes to be admissible as 
evidence in legal proceedings, and raised a presumption that the meeting and its 
proceedings were regular.13 That was it. All the rest of the rules about what rights 
of governance shareholders were to have, and how they were to exercise them, 
were to be found in the company’s constitution. So, for example, regulations 29-51 
—————————————————— 
9 Section 49 followed Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 32. 
10  Section 52 had no precursor in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. 
11  Elements of these sections drew on Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, ss. 35-36. 
12  This section followed Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 34. A ‘special resolution’ is a 
resolution only passed by a weighted majority (essentially, 75 per cent of the votes cast) which 
is required for certain transactions, the number of which has increased markedly over the years. 
See below. 
13  This section followed Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 40. 
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of the standard default form of articles (contained in the First Schedule to the 
1862 Act)14
 
provided for the calling of general meetings, the form of their 
proceedings, the votes of members and the methods of voting.15 
 
2.2 The enduring legal principles 
 
In terms of principle, this necessarily meant that, subject to any statutory regula-
tion, governance rights in a company were allocated by its articles of 
association,16 which themselves were given effect by section 16 of the Companies 
Act 1862.17 Most fundamentally, therefore, and subject only to very limited 
intervention by the 1862 Act, those who formed a company were given freedom 
by statute to order its governance as they saw fit. As Bowen L.J. put it, in Harben 
v. Phillips, 
 
[W]hen persons agree to act together in the conduct of a business, the way in 
which that business is to be carried on must depend in each case on the con-
tract, express or implied, which exists between them as to the way of carrying 
it on. … When you come to statutory corporations you must look at the statute 
itself, and the rules which are created under it…18 
 
This is a vitally important statement of legal principle, and it must be clearly 
understood, as it forms the basis of so much in British corporate law and practice. 
A registered company limited by shares is indeed the creature of statute.19 The 
point is that statute has itself granted shareholders in a company the general 
contractual freedom to organise their own affairs, and those of their company, as 
they see fit, subject always to any applicable regulation. (Parliament has not 
—————————————————— 
14  Hereinafter, ‘Table A (1862)’. 
15  These regulations drew largely on regs. 22-43 of Table B in the Schedule to the Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1856. They broadly presage what are now regs. 36-63 of the modern 
default form of articles, Table A in the Companies (Tables A–F.) Regulations 1985 (SI 
1985/805), hereinafter ‘Table A (1985)’. 
16  The rest of this article will refer only to articles of association, because the overwhelm-
ingly standard practice is to establish shareholders’ governance arrangements in a company’s 
articles rather than its memorandum. The author has surveyed the articles as at 16 January 2004 
of all the companies constituting the FTSE 100 Index at that date. That survey showed all such 
arrangements to be in the respective companies’ articles. For present purposes, therefore, all 
references to a FTSE 100 company’s articles are references to its articles as they appeared in 
that survey. 
17  Section 16 drew largely on Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 10. Section 16, after 
much intervening re-enactment, now forms section 14 of the Companies Act 1985. 
18  (1883) 23 Ch.D. 14, 35-36. 
19  See, recently, Halifax plc v. Halifax Repossessions Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 331, [2004] 2 
B.C.L.C. 455, at [13], per Arden L.J., and also Welton v. Saffery [1897] A.C. 299 at p. 305, per 
Lord Halsbury L.C. 
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necessarily granted equivalent freedom for shareholders to order their dealings 
with ‘outsiders’ to the company. This article, however, focuses on the internal 
governance of companies, where that freedom is fundamental.) As a matter of 
policy and history, English law has long recognised the general freedom of those 
who establish a business to order their own affairs amongst themselves. For 
example, arrangements between the members of a commercial partnership are 
simply a contract, and the partners enjoy normal freedom of contract when they 
make such arrangements, subject to any applicable regulation.20 What Parliament 
did in 1862, drawing on earlier ideas, was to carry that general freedom of 
contract into the new statutory system of corporate law. Parliament created a 
simple mechanism by which private parties could request and obtain the Act of 
State necessary to establish a corporation, but Parliament also carried into that 
new system the contractual freedom for the parties to order their own affairs 
within the corporation, subject always to any applicable regulation. That freedom 
still forms a basic principle of company law in the United Kingdom. 
The point is made plain by the very words of the Companies Act 1985. A 
company must have articles of association: it will either have its own, specially 
drafted articles, or else Table A (1985) will form its articles by default.21 Section 
14 of the Act then provides that: 
 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles, when 
registered, bind the company and its members to the same extent as if they 
respectively had been signed and sealed by each member, and contained cove-
nants on the part of each member to observe all the provisions of the 
memorandum and of the articles.22 
 
Quite simply, this means that the shareholders (members) choose the terms of the 
arrangements between them, and the law gives effect to those arrangements, 
subject to any applicable regulation. That effect is explicitly contractual in nature, 
even though the effect is mandated by statute rather than by the common law. 
So even the most fundamental rights of shareholders in a company, such as the 
right to attend and vote at general meetings, the number of votes each shareholder 
—————————————————— 
20  See, generally, N. Lindley and R.C. l’Anson Banks, Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 
18th edn. (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2002). 
21  Companies Act 1985, s. 8. The effect of section 8 will be continued by clauses 18-20 of 
the Companies Bill. 
22  There is a very great deal of detailed learning on – and glossing of – section 14 and its 
various predecessor provisions. See generally the Hon Mrs Justice Arden and D. Prentice, 
Buckley on the Companies Acts (London, Butterworths 2000) at [14.5]-[14.10]; and P.L. 
Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 7th edn. (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2003) pp. 58-65. None of that unsatisfactory detail, or glossing, is relevant for present 
purposes. What is relevant is the basic principle of statute giving legal effect to consensual 
arrangements. The effect of section 14 will be continued by clause 34 of the Companies Bill. 
 Richard C. Nolan EBOR 7(2006) 556 
has in respect of a share and the right to participate in the company’s profits, are 
all established by the company’s articles of association, not by a mandatory rule 
of law. Likewise, the rights which provide for expression of the fundamental 
control rights of shareholders, rights such as the right to speak at meetings, 
appoint proxies and so forth, all have their origin as rights established by a 
company’s articles, though, as will be seen, some of these rights (such as the right 
to appoint a proxy) have in large measure been overtaken by mandatory statute 
law.23 
 
2.3 The influence of context on principle 
 
Of course, notwithstanding this original legal freedom to organise the internal 
governance structures of a company, the means of communication available in the 
nineteenth century significantly constrained how the members of a company 
could interact with each other and take decisions. Face-to-face meetings were the 
most practical way for members of a company to participate in its affairs, given 
the technologies available at the time. There were the possibilities of voting by 
post,24
 
and later through a proxy deposited by telegraph,25
 
but these never dis-
placed the significance of meetings. 
This meant that questions about the constitution and proceedings of company 
meetings came to be litigated, and when the express terms of a company’s articles 
did not, by themselves, resolve the issue, the courts applied by analogy various 
principles established in cases which concerned meetings in other contexts, such 
as public meetings or the meetings of chartered corporations.26 Some of those 
principles were default rules, which could be ousted or modified by a company’s 
articles: for example, the principle that failure to give due notice of a meeting to 
all those entitled to such notice vitiates the meeting,27 a rule which is now 
generally modified by a company’s articles,28
 
as well as rules governing the 
—————————————————— 
23  For confirmation, see, e.g., Table A (1985) or the expressly drafted articles of associa-
tion of a company such as BP plc. 
24  McMillan v. Le Roi Mining Company Ltd. [1906] 1 Ch. 331 adverts to this possibility, 
though the High Court in fact struck down a postal ballot held by the company, because it could 
not hold postal ballots consistently with its articles. However, the clear implication is that had 
the articles been different, so too might have been the result. 
25  Re English, Scottish & Australian Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385 illustrates this possibility, 
though the case itself concerned a statutory meeting to approve a scheme of arrangement. 
26  See D. Impey, et al., The Modern Law of Meetings (Bristol, Jordans 2005); I. Shearman, 
Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2006); A. Hamer 
and A. Robertson, Running Company Meetings (Hemel Hempstead, ICSA Publishing 1997). 
27  Smyth v. Darley (1849) 2 H.L. Cas. 789, 9 E.R. 1293; Musselwhite v. C.H. Musselwhite 
& Son Ltd. [1962] Ch. 964; Royal Mutual Benefit B.S. v. Sharman [1963] 1 WLR 581. 
28  See, e.g., Table A (1985), reg. 39. Such an article is vitally important in practice, because 
English statute law contains no provision mitigating the common law consequences of failure 
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adjournment of meetings.29 Other examples of those principles might well be 
mandatory, drawing their force from considerations of public policy, such as the 
rule that requires notices of meetings to be fair, accurate and comprehensible, 
particularly as regards decisions which concern directors’ own interests relating to 
the company.30 Case law also elucidated terms used in the statute, or in a com-
pany’s articles, such as the question of what actually amounted to a ‘meeting’.31 
Still, none of this law demanded any particular form of corporate decision mak-
ing by shareholders. The law regulated general meetings, which originally were 
only required by section 49 of the Companies Act 1862 and by any relevant 
provisions of a company’s own articles, and it filled any gaps in those articles. The 
key to shareholders’ rights within a company, and the key to the exercise of those 
rights, were the governance structures adopted by the shareholders themselves, 
embodied in the company’s articles of association and given effect by section 16 of 
the 1862 Act, the precursor to section 14 of the Companies Act 1985. 
The matter did not rest there, of course. Over time, mandatory statute law 
came increasingly to regulate how shareholders in a company were to participate 
in its affairs. This regulation assumed that shareholders would make decisions at 
face-to-face meetings. These assumptions were reflected in the statutory drafting, 
and statute, drawing on those assumptions, all too often entrenched them. 
 
 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC FRAMEWORK 
 
Since the 1862 Act, shareholder rights in British companies have been subjected 
to increasing regulation. There has been some deregulation since 1985, but the 
overall trend has definitely been towards greater regulation. That trend is contin-
ued, at least in so far as listed companies are concerned, by Part 14 of the 
Companies Bill. Much detailed history is needed to explain precisely how this 
body of regulation grew, and that history is addressed extensively elsewhere.32 
For present purposes, however, three key points must be made. 
First, regulation of the basic freedom for shareholders to make their own ar-
rangements for the internal governance of their company, a freedom established 
by section 14 of the Companies Act 1985 (and its precursors), is found in various 
places. There is, in particular, the explicit regulation of Part IX, Chapter IV of the 
Companies Act 1985. There are the assumptions factored into various statutory 
definitions which affect how shareholders interact with each other. In addition, in 
—————————————————— 
to give due notice, unlike the laws of other Commonwealth jurisdictions, such as Australia 
(Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.), s. 1322) and Singapore (Companies Act, s. 392). 
29  See, e.g., Byng v. London Life [1990] Ch. 170. 
30  Kaye v. Croydon Tramways [1898] 1 Ch. 358. 
31  See again Byng v. London Life [1990] Ch. 170. 
32  Nolan, loc. cit. n. 6, at pp. 103-113. 
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so far as listed companies are concerned, there are relevant provisions of the 
Listing Rules. Secondly, notwithstanding this regulation, many aspects of 
shareholder rights in British companies are still governed by the arrangements 
established inter se by the shareholders in a company and embodied in the 
company’s articles of association. Some examples will make this clear. Thirdly, 
this system has much to recommend it in normative terms. Each of these points is 
important and deserves a little more attention. 
 
3.1 Regulating the basic framework 
 
3.1.1 Explicit statutory regulation 
 
Part IX of Chapter IV of the Companies Act 1985 contains many provisions, first 
enacted over the years and consolidated into the present statute, which limit or 
regulate the extent to which shareholders may establish for themselves their rights 
in a company. Some important aspects of this regulation are as follows. A public 
company must hold an annual general meeting, much as a private company, 
unless it opts out of this requirement by unanimity of all the shareholders who 
may attend and vote at the meeting which elects to avail itself of the opt-out.33 A 
certain percentage of members in a company (those holding at lease 10 per cent of 
its paid-up voting capital) may requisition a general meeting of the company.34 A 
lesser percentage of members (members holding at least 5 per cent of the voting 
rights, or 100 members who, on average, have paid up at least £100 in respect of 
their shares) may insist on certain items being on the agenda of a general meeting, 
and they may require that a circular be sent to shareholders about a resolution.35 A 
very small number of members (five, or, in some circumstances, fewer) may 
insist on a poll vote (rather than a mere show of hands) to decide on a resolution 
put to a meeting.36 Companies limited by shares must allow voting by proxy.37 
There are also other, more detailed provisions about how meetings are to be run, 
some of which are mandatory rules (such as the minimum length of notice for a 
meeting), others of which are default rules (such as quorum requirements).38 
 
3.1.2 Implicit statutory regulation 
 
The business to be done by shareholders may also implicitly limit the means 
through which they can govern their company. Statutory definitions are the key 
—————————————————— 
33  Companies Act 1985, ss. 366, 366A. 
34  Companies Act 1985, s. 368. 
35  Companies Act 1985, s. 376. 
36  Companies Act 1985, s. 373. 
37  Companies Act 1985, s. 372. 
38  See, e.g., Companies Act 1985, ss. 369, 370. 
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issue here. The point is that where mandatory statute law requires adherence to a 
particular form for an act to be valid, private parties cannot override that require-
ment by the arrangements they have made between themselves. 
Very often, a decision must be taken by special resolution,39
 
and occasionally 
by extraordinary resolution.40 The definitions of ‘special resolution’ and ‘extraor-
dinary resolution’ are both currently found in section 378 of the Companies Act 
1985. Both definitions require that votes be cast ‘at a general meeting’ in order 
for the resolution in question to be carried. (This surely includes votes on a poll 
called at the general meeting.41.) Both definitions also require a 75 per cent 
majority of those voting in person or by proxy and not, for example, by post. 
Consequently, if a company wishes to pass a special resolution or an extraordi-
nary resolution, it will have to hold a meeting, unless the number of members in 
the company is small enough to make it possible to obtain the unanimous consent 
of the members, which usually functions as a surrogate for any resolution passed 
at a meeting of shareholders.42 
Over time, the constraints which flow from the definitions of ‘special resolu-
tions’ and ‘extraordinary resolutions’ have grown in their practical importance. 
Under the Companies Act 1862, special resolutions were used only to change a 
company’s articles,43 and extraordinary resolutions were only used to begin the 
voluntary winding up of a company.44 Consequently, a company rarely needed to 
convene a meeting in order to pass a special or an extraordinary resolution. 
Correspondingly, the definitions of such resolutions rarely constrained how 
shareholders took a decision. Nowadays, special resolutions are needed for many 
—————————————————— 
39  Business requiring a special resolution, which might commonly be encountered at a 
company’s general meeting, includes various alterations to the company’s memorandum 
(Companies Act 1985, ss. 4-6, 17, 28, 43, 53), alterations to its articles (ibid., s. 9), disapplica-
tion of pre-emption rights over unissued capital (ibid., ss. 89, 95), reduction of capital (ibid., s. 
135) and authorisation to buy back shares off-market or under a contingent purchase contract 
(ibid., ss. 164, 165). 
40  For example, the alteration of class rights under Companies Act 1985, s. 125(2), or 
voluntary winding up under Insolvency Act 1986, s. 84(1)(c). 
41  See Shaw v. Tati Concessions Ltd. [1913] 1 Ch. 292; Spiller v. Mayo (Rhodesia) Devel-
opment Co. (1908) Ltd. [1926] W.N. 78 and Holmes v. Keyes [1959] Ch. 199. 
42  Such consent might be (i) pursuant to the company’s articles, such as Table A (1985), 
reg. 53; (ii) in the case of a private company, pursuant to Companies Act 1985, ss. 381A-381C 
and Schedule 15A; or (iii) pursuant to the common law principle of informal unanimous 
consent (see, e.g., Re Express Engineering Works Ltd. [1920] 1 Ch. 466; Re Duomatic Ltd. 
[1969] 2 Ch. 365; Cane v. Jones [1980] 1 WLR 1451; Wright v. Atlas Wright (Europe) Ltd. 
[1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 301; Re Torvale Group Ltd. [1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 605; Euro Brokers Holdings 
Ltd. v. Monecor (London) Ltd. [2003] EWCA Civ 105, [2003] 1 B.C.L.C. 506, at [61]-[63], per 
Leslie Kosmin Q.C., [2003] EWCA Civ 105, [2003] 1 B.C.L.C. 506, at [57]-[63], per 
Mummery L.J.; and EIC Services Ltd. v. Phipps [2003] EWHC 1507 (Ch), [2003] BCC 931, at 
[121]-[122], per Neuberger J). 
43  Companies Act 1862, s. 50. 
44  Ibid., s. 129. See MacConnell v. E. Prill & Co. Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch. 57 at p. 62, per Sargant J. 
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more purposes.45 At present, therefore, the definition of a special resolution 
constitutes a much greater practical limitation on how shareholders may effec-
tively take decisions. 
The definition of an elective resolution likewise anticipates a meeting of the 
(.private) company in question,46 unless there is unanimous consent of the 
company’s members in lieu of a meeting.47 However, such resolutions are quite 
explicitly designed to simplify the administration of closely held private compa-
nies and allow such companies to be run with less need for meetings so long as 
the resolutions remain in force. The form of elective resolutions does not, 
therefore, constitute an enduring limitation on how shareholders may choose to 
manage their affairs within a company. 
There are other circumstances where the mandatory requirements of statute 
prescribe a certain form of decision making, and this will override the arrange-
ments made by the shareholders in a company and embodied in its articles of 
association. Examples of this are cases where ‘outsiders’ to a decision by mem-
bers of a company have rights to participate in the process which leads to decision 
(e.g., a director’s right to protest at his removal)48 or cases where the courts 
consider that statute has prescribed particular forms of decision making at least in 
part for the benefit of such ‘outsiders’ (e.g., a resolution by the members of a 
company to authorise it to purchase its own shares, which thereby affects credi-
tors’ interests).49 In these cases, the shareholders in a company must adhere 
strictly to the relevant form(s) of decision making prescribed by statute. 
Other statutory provisions may require members of a company to make a deci-
sion at a physical general meeting, or else by means of some other device 
approved by statute, such as a statutory written resolution, even though the 
relevant provisions do not give rights to anyone who is not a member of the 
company. For example, statute may require that members of a company ‘pass a 
resolution’ if they wish to achieve a certain result, and such language may then 
implicitly forbid other forms of decision making by the members, unless other 
provisions of statute explicitly authorise such conduct.50 Again, a formal meeting 
may be necessary to persuade a court to exercise some discretion,51 though 
—————————————————— 
45  See n. 39 above. 
46  Companies Act 1985, s. 379A. 
47  Companies Act 1985, s. 381A(6). 
48  The right of shareholders in a company to remove a director of the company by passing 
an ordinary resolution to that effect, a right which cannot be ousted by private arrangements, is 
found in Companies Act 1985, s. 303. The director’s right to protest at a proposal to remove 
him is in Companies Act 1985, s. 304. 
49  See, e.g., Re R.W. Peak (Kings Lynn) Ltd. [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 193, and the more general 
statements of principle in Wright v. Atlas Wright (Europe) Ltd. [1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 301. 
50  See Re R.W. Peak (Kings Lynn) Ltd. [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 193. 
51  See the possibility raised, though not the result reached, in Re Barry Artist Ltd. [1985] 1 
WLR 1305. 
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perhaps a valid statutory written resolution would now suffice. Interestingly, all 
the provisions of this nature which have come to court concern decisions by 
members of a company which can directly prejudice the interests of those who are 
not members of a company, such as the company’s creditors. In such cases, the 
courts are, perhaps, particularly concerned to see strict adherence procedure as a 
safeguard for those who are directly affected by the decision but cannot formally 
participate in it. 
 
3.1.3 The influence of the Listing Rules 
 
A company must adhere to the Listing Rules in order to maintain a full listing on 
the London Stock Exchange. These Rules have also affected the freedom of a 
listed company to establish structures for participation by its shareholders in the 
company’s affairs. For a long time, the Listing Rules required the articles to 
contain certain terms, some of which were relevant to participation by sharehold-
ers in the company,52 though the Stock Exchange (then the listing authority) could 
always, in its discretion, waive compliance, either fully or in part.53 Later editions 
of the Listing Rules removed nearly all the requirements for articles to contain 
certain terms, though the Stock Exchange, and then its successor as regulator, the 
United Kingdom Listing Authority, still required a listed company to submit its 
articles to scrutiny and control if they contained unusual terms.54 More recently 
still, however, the United Kingdom Listing Authority has removed even this 
requirement of submission and control.55 As a result, the current edition of the 
Listing Rules only controls the provisions (if any) of a listed company’s articles 
which govern the form in which a member of the company may appoint a proxy, 
or which impose sanctions on a member of the company for failure to comply 
with section 212 of the Companies Act 1985 (disclosure to a company of interests 
in its shares).56 
—————————————————— 
52  Listing Rules (1966 ed.) rule 1 and Appendix, section A; rule II(a)(iv) and Schedule VII, 
Part A, paras. F, H and L; (1973 ed.) rule 159 and Appendix 34, Schedule VII, Part A, paras. F, 
H, L; (1979 ed.) rules 1, 6 and Schedule VII, Part A, paras. F, H, L; (1984 ed.) section 2, 
chapter 1, rule 2.5 and section 9, chapter 1, paras. 6, 8, 12, 14; (1993 ed.) rules 13.8, 13.28, 
13.29 and Appendix 1 to chapter 13, paras. 12, 13, 18, 19, 22; (2000 ed.) rules 9.26, 9.43, 
13.28, 13.29; (2005 ed.) rules 9.3.6, 9.3.7, 9.3.9. 
53  Listing Rules (1966 ed.) Appendix, para. 1; (1973 ed.) Appendix 34, para. 2; (1979 ed.) 
Appendix, para. 1; (1984 ed.) section 1, chapter 1, para. 2; (1993 ed.) rule 13.3; (2000 ed.) rules 
1.11-1.14; (2005 ed.) rule 1.2.1. 
54  Listing Rules (1993 ed.) rules 13.1 and 13.3; (2000 ed.) rule 13.3 (which followed the 
language of Amendment 14 of January 2000 to the 1993 ed.). 
55  See the Listing Rules (2005 ed.). 
56  Listing Rules (2005 ed.) rules 9.3.6, 9.3.7, 9.3.9. 
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So the Listing Rules have, in their time, formed a constraint on the freedom of 
a listed company to establish the terms on which its shareholders will participate 
in the company’s affairs. They have never been a major constraint on such 
freedom, however, as they never concerned more than a few aspects of these 
structures. They now have very little impact at all in this regard. Still, over time, 
the Listing Rules have driven the creation of particular terms of engagement 
between a listed company and its shareholders, and inertia – perhaps more 
accurately, path dependence – may mean that such terms still are common today, 
even though the Listing Rules are much less relevant for present purposes than 
was once the case. 
The net effect of this regulation is to make company meetings a necessity for 
decision making by shareholders, unless the number of members in the company 
is small enough to make it possible to obtain the unanimous consent of the 
members, which functions as a surrogate for a resolution passed at a meeting in 
the vast majority of cases, and such informality is allowed (as it generally is). The 
irony is that this state of affairs is principally the result of unarticulated assump-
tions rather than conscious policy choices. The only conscious policy choices in 
favour of general meetings as the forum for the exercise of shareholders’ govern-
ance rights are the requirement for an annual general meeting, in so far as it 
applies, and the ability of members to call a meeting of the company. Otherwise, 
shareholders’ meetings are required because of assumptions: for example, 
because a meeting is needed in order to pass a special or an extraordinary 
resolution, as has been explained, or to perform certain acts such as sacking a 
director. The policy of requiring meetings in this age of electronic communica-
tions has not been extensively articulated in the United Kingdom.57 Assumptions 
about how shareholders may practically organise their rights in a company and 
provide for the expression of those rights within the company – assumptions 
drawn from a bygone age – still inform the modern regulation of the sharehold-
ers’ basic freedom to establish those rights and the means for expressing those 
rights through the terms of the company’s articles of association. 
 
—————————————————— 
57  As regards practitioner interest in the United Kingdom, see Company Law Review, 
Company General Meetings and Shareholder Communication (London, 1999) § 14. As regards 
academic interest, mostly abroad, see, e.g., S. Bottomley, ‘From Contractualism to Constitu-
tionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance’, 19 Sydney Law Review (1997) p. 277 and 
The Role of Shareholders’ Meetings in Improving Corporate Governance (Canberra, Centre for 
Commercial Law, Faculty of Law, ANU 2003); R. Simmonds, ‘Why Must We Meet? Thinking 
about why Shareholders’ Meetings are Required’, 19 Company and Securities Law Journal 
(2001) p. 506; F. Bonollo, ‘Electronic Meetings’, 14 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
(2002) p. 95; E.J. Boros, ‘Corporate Governance in Cyberspace: Who Stands to Gain What 
From the Virtual Meeting?’, 3 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2003) p. 149 and ‘Virtual 
Shareholder Meetings: Who Decides How Companies Make Decisions?’, 28 Melbourne 
University Law Review (2004) p. 265. 
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3.2 The continuing relevance of the basic framework 
 
The fundamental freedom of shareholders to organise their own rights of govern-
ance within a company, from the basic rights of voting and economic 
participation through to the means of exercising and expressing those rights, is 
still vital. Some further examples might be useful to emphasise this point.58 
 
3.2.1 Examples 
 
Articles often set out in much greater detail than Table A (1985)59 the information 
which is to be given to shareholders by way of notice for a general meeting.60 
Multi-site meetings are permitted as a matter of general English law,61 and a 
company’s articles can work within this freedom to ensure that such meetings are 
not held invalid for want of notice or because of technical lapses in communica-
tion between the various sites of the meeting.62 Particular items of business, or 
particular procedures attaching to particular items of business, can be highlighted, 
so that particularly important decisions – or the manner in which they are taken – 
are emphasised. All these things go to the good governance of a company. 
Articles also generally provide that accidental failures in the provision of notices 
for a meeting will not invalidate that meeting or the business done at it.63 They 
can also make provision for unanticipated changes to the time or location of 
meetings, while preserving the validity of the meeting.64 
Articles can control where meetings are to be held.65 This might seem a minor 
matter, but it is rather less so in companies which are the result of cross-border 
mergers, where the company has to accommodate shareholder bases in more than 
one country and the sensitivities of those shareholders. 
Articles facilitate the administration of general meetings. They may provide 
that the entitlement to vote is established at a particular record time before the 
—————————————————— 
58  As well as Table A (1985), the articles of Amersham plc, Astrazeneca plc, BHP Billiton 
plc, BP plc and Carnival plc all contain useful examples of the use, and consequent importance, 
of this freedom. They are far from the only examples. They do, however, give a flavour of 
relevant current practice: they demonstrate qualitatively what can be, and has been, done. An 
exhaustive quantitative report on such practice is a project for another time. 
59  See Table A (1985), reg. 38. 
60  Amersham plc, Art. 50; Astrazeneca plc, Art. 33; BP plc, Arts. 59, 60; Carnival plc, 
Arts. 100-102. Contrast BHP Billiton plc, Art. 47, giving huge discretion to the company’s 
board. 
61  Byng v. London Life [1990] Ch. 170. 
62  Amersham plc, Art. 51; Astrazeneca plc, Art. 34; BHP Billiton plc, Art. 53(5); BP plc, 
Art. 62; Carnival plc, Arts. 103-105. 
63  See, e.g., Table A (1985), reg. 39. 
64  Amersham plc, Art. 51.5; Astrazeneca plc, Art. 34.5; Carnival plc, Art. 107. 
65  BP plc, Art. 55. 
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meeting.66 This facilitates verification of votes tendered at the meeting, by 
allowing the company to use records for that purpose which it will actually have 
in its possession at the meeting. (Precisely up-to-date records will not be available 
to a company whose shares are traded continuously.) Articles can provide 
protection from errors in the voting process, which (in small measure, at least) are 
almost inevitable when casting and counting the many millions of votes held by 
the various shareholders of a large listed company.67 Articles also commonly give 
many powers to the chairman of a company’s general meeting, most of them 
administrative (such as powers of adjournment, powers to call a poll and powers 
to maintain good order), some of them substantive (such as a casting vote).68 
Articles can categorise items of business or resolutions to be addressed at 
general meetings. For example, in recent times, companies have drawn and used 
distinctions between ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ resolutions, in order to control 
how business is done at a general meeting.69 Articles provide that a ‘substantive 
resolution’ (as defined) can only validly be considered or passed at a meeting if 
the text of the resolution was set out exactly in the notice by which the meeting 
was convened. Thus, no amendment to a substantive resolution can be adopted at 
the meeting without thereby making it impossible to pass the resolution.70 This 
control over amendments might seem to advance the interests of directors over 
shareholders, enabling the directors to exert a tighter grip on the agenda of a 
meeting. In fact, the opposite is true. It enables shareholders who do not attend a 
meeting to know exactly what business will be done at the meeting, so they can 
appoint and instruct proxies accordingly. 
Another issue which companies’ articles of association nowadays address in 
growing detail is security at general meetings. Articles therefore often contain 
explicit provision for directors (and management generally) to put in place 
security arrangements at general meetings, and shareholders’ rights are subjected 
to those arrangements.71 While a company most likely has an implied default 
—————————————————— 
66  BP plc, Art. 60(D). 
67  See the different techniques adopted by Amersham plc, Art. 74; Astrazeneca, Arts. 43, 
55; BHP Billiton plc, Arts. 55(4), 55(1); BP plc, Arts. 71, 80; Carnival plc, Arts. 135, 144, 153. 
68  See, e.g., Table A (1985), regs. 45, 46(a), 47-51, 58; Amersham plc, Arts. 55, 57-58, 
59(a), 60-64; Astrazeneca plc, Arts. 38, 40-41, 42(a), 43-47; BHP Billiton plc, Arts. 48, 50-56; 
BP plc, Arts. 64, 66-67, 70(i), 71-74, 80; Carnival plc, Arts. 110, 114-115, 117-119, 133(a), 
135, 137-139, 141, 144. 
69  BHP Billiton plc, Arts. 2, 54; BP plc, Arts. 2, 69. To similar effect are Amersham plc, 
Art. 58 and Astrazeneca plc, Art. 41. Carnival plc, Art. 117 envisages amendments to substan-
tive resolutions, but enables the chairman to adjourn consideration of an amended substantive 
resolution. 
70  Amendments to correct clerical or manifest error are commonly permitted: ibid. See also 
Re Moorgate Mercantile Holdings Ltd. [1980] 1 WLR 227 as regards the amendment of a 
resolution that requires exact notice (in that case, a special resolution). 
71  Amersham plc, Art. 52.2; Astrazeneca plc, Art. 35.2; BHP Billiton plc, Art. 53(2); BP 
plc, Arts. 63, 74-75; Carnival plc, Art. 110. 
Shareholder Rights in Britain 565
power at common law, exercisable through its board, to institute security ar-
rangements at its general meetings,72 specific articles are much clearer and often 
more wide-ranging. The exercise of these powers can be a very sensitive issue 
indeed, particularly where protesters against the company’s business or activities 
are shareholders and make a scene at the company’s general meeting in a manner 
which may be threatening to others present. 
Articles can also place restrictions or limitations on shareholders’ voting 
rights. Such restrictions are very commonly used as a means of putting practical 
pressure on shareholders to comply with other obligations. So, for example, 
shares are commonly disenfranchised while calls made on their holder remain 
unpaid.73 Again, shares are very often disenfranchised in cases where a public 
company serves a notice pursuant to section 212 of the Companies Act 1985 to 
discover who is beneficially interested in its shares and there is a failure to 
comply with the notice.74 Indeed, articles often impose even more onerous 
restrictions on shares which are the subject of an unanswered section 212 notice: 
the company may refuse to pay dividends otherwise payable on the shares, and it 
may in certain circumstances refuse to register transfers of the shares.75 
There are many other examples of the various ways in which a company’s 
articles of association can determine how shareholders will exercise their rights 
within a company. For the present, it is worth mentioning the extent to which 
articles govern the appointment and revocation of proxies;76 the way in which 
articles can be used effectively to enfranchise those with interests in shares who 
are not, however, the legal owners of the shares;77 the provision which can be 
made for purely consultative meetings78 or for interested non-shareholders to view 
—————————————————— 
72  Hamer and Robertson, op. cit. n. 26, at p. 86, paras. 10.2, 10.4. Note Barton v. Taylor 
(1886) 11 App. Cas. 197 at p. 204, per Lord Selborne and John v. Rees [1969] 2 WLR 1294 
which concerned meetings, but not company general meetings, as well as Byng v. London Life 
[1990] Ch. 170 at p. 187, per Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. 
73  Amersham plc, Art. 70; BP plc, Art. 79; Carnival plc, Art. 151. Forfeiture for non-
payment of calls does not amount to an unlawful reduction of capital (Trevor v. Whitworth 
(1887) 12 App. Cas. 409 at p. 417, per Lord Herschell, p. 429, per Lord Watson and p. 438, per 
Lord Macnaughten), and so it can be authorised by a company’s articles irrespective of the 
statutory procedures for the reduction of capital or the redemption or repurchase of shares. 
74  Amersham plc, Arts. 71-72; Astrazeneca plc, Arts. 53-54; BHP Billiton plc, Art. 64; BP 
plc, Art. 87; Carnival plc, Arts. 155-156. See also n. 50 above and its accompanying text. 
75  Ibid. 
76  See, e.g., Table A (1985), regs. 60-63; Amersham plc, Arts. 76-79, 81; Astrazeneca plc, 
Arts. 58-61, 63; BHP Billiton plc, Arts. 68-71; BP plc, Arts. 81-86; Carnival plc, Arts. 161-167, 
169. This is so, even though the right of a shareholder to appoint a proxy is now enshrined in 
statute by Companies Act 1985, s. 372, as indicated in the text to n. 37 above. 
77  See, e.g., Amersham plc, Art. 80; Astrazeneca plc, Arts. 135-142; BP plc, Arts. 157-170. 
See below, and also Nolan, loc. cit. n. 7. 
78  BAE plc, Art. 105(B). 
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meetings without participating in them;79 and the additional provision which can 
be made for a single corporate shareholder to appoint several representatives at a 
company’s general meeting.80 
 
3.2.2 Summary 
 
In order to understand shareholder rights in a British company, therefore, it is 
necessary to look first at the company’s articles of association and see what rights 
are established there. These rights – these express terms – are supplemented by 
default implied terms, which apply in so far as the express terms do not make any 
relevant provision.81 In turn, the fundamentally contractual arrangements between 
the shareholders are subjected to regulation, discussed above, which prohibits 
certain terms of those arrangements and insists on certain others. 
There is, therefore, no single statement of shareholder rights in a British com-
pany. Correspondingly, it is entirely wrong to think that positive law (whether 
statute or case law or both) directly establishes or lists most, let alone all, of a 
shareholder’s rights in a British company: to look at positive law alone as the 
basis for such rights is to misunderstand the position entirely. 
 
3.2.3 The advantages of the basic framework 
 
To someone unused to it, the British framework for shareholder rights might seem 
inelegant at least. There is no single, tidy statement of shareholder rights. Share-
holder rights are not necessarily uniform between companies – even between 
listed companies. It all might look a little chaotic and primitive. Far from it. 
The foregoing survey of history and current practice shows that the rules 
which govern shareholders’ exercise of their rights in a company – and, indeed, 
those rights themselves – have evolved, through the repeated, iterative interaction 
of various parties. Shareholders and companies – or, more accurately, the legal 
practitioners who draft the internal corporate arrangements that the shareholders 
ultimately adopt – have devised various structures through which shareholders 
(and others) can participate in the governance of a company. They have done so 
—————————————————— 
79  See, e.g., BP plc, Art. 62(C). 
80  See, e.g., Amersham plc, Art. 80. It is at least arguable that, on its true construction, 
Companies Act 1985, s. 375 only allows a corporate shareholder to appoint one representative: 
see P. Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares: Report by Paul Myners to the 
Shareholder Voting Working Group (London, 2004) p. 27. The ability for a single corporate 
shareholder to appoint more than one representative is vitally important where the shareholder 
is a nominee for many different beneficiaries: see ibid., and see also the discussion of Art. 13 of 
the Directive, below. 
81  Such implied terms can exist at common law (see, e.g., Birch v. Cropper (1889) 14 App. 
Cas. 525 establishing a default presumption of equality amongst shares) or under statute (e.g., 
Companies Act 1985, s. 370). 
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to the extent admitted by changing companies legislation, though regulation, both 
statutory and non-statutory, may sometimes limit what they can do. They have 
learnt from each others’ work, and they have in turn adapted their practice 
accordingly. They have also interacted with, and reacted in response to, the courts 
when the structures they devised came to be challenged. Much less frequently – 
though one might not think so at present – they have lobbied for changes in the 
law and so brought the process of legal evolution back to focus on legislation. 
There are two main grounds for continuing to prefer the present approach. 
They are liberalism and efficiency. 
Why liberalism? British company law manifests deliberate choices in favour 
of allowing shareholders to exercise residual and ultimate control in companies, 
and these choices have been confirmed in the United Kingdom for the foreseeable 
future at least.82 This choice has very substantial support, at least outside the 
academy,83 and it necessarily implies that companies are, so far as their share-
holders are concerned, voluntary associations in which they, the shareholders, 
exercise residual and ultimate control. So long as that choice continues to 
command such support, legislation should continue to proceed from a presump-
tive premise that shareholders should be allowed to order their own affairs within 
their company. Naturally, very different considerations come into play when 
considering the ‘proprietary’ aspects of company law, such as rules on capital and 
limited liability, where the interests of non-consenting parties are affected by the 
rules chosen.84 None of this, however, denies the possibility of regulating even the 
internal structures of companies. It simply establishes a presumption in favour of 
free association and demands reasons to depart from that presumption. 
Why efficiency? In order to answer the question, it is necessary to recall that 
efficiency is an instrumental good: it assumes a desired goal. In the present case, 
that goal is, for reasons just noted, to facilitate the creation of voluntary associa-
tions (companies) in which the members of those companies can, at least 
—————————————————— 
82  The question of altering the model of the company was squarely posed for the Company 
Law Review: Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (London, 1998) § 3.7. The 
Review gave an equally clear answer to the question in favour of retaining the present, 
shareholder-focussed model: see The Strategic Framework (London, 1999) chapter 5.1; 
Developing the Framework (London, 2000) chapter 3; Completing the Structure (London, 
2000) chapter 3.5. The UK government adopted the conclusions of the Reviews: Modernising 
Company Law (Cm. 5553 (2002)) § 3.3. None of this means that any other model of associative 
enterprise must necessarily be rejected: it simply means that the Companies Acts embody one 
model and will continue to do so. Other models, such as friendly societies and community 
interest companies, are provided by other statutes for use in other, appropriate, contexts. 
83  E. Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
1999) at p. 132. 
84  As to the ‘proprietary’ aspects of corporate law, see J. Armour and M.J. Whincop, The 
Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, University of Cambridge CBR Working Paper 
299, available at: <http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/cgi-bin/cbr_wpfull3.pl?series=cbrwps&filename= 
cbr2005&=WP299>. 
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presumptively, order their own affairs. So what is efficient in that context? Law 
which allows companies and their lawyers to devise the internal structures of 
companies is much more likely to evolve into useful, efficient forms, with 
variations that reflect different circumstances, than rules made by a legislature, 
which often form a single set of rules, or at most one set of rules for private 
companies and another for public companies.85 Legislation could very helpfully 
provide default rules for companies, so that small companies are not necessarily 
put to the expense of changing their articles in order to take advantage of new 
developments. Nevertheless, legislation should not set a certain practice in stone 
and thereby freeze innovation, as has happened in the past.86 Again, however, 
none of this involves rejecting any thought of regulating a company’s internal 
structure: it too raises a presumption in favour of free association and demands 
reasons to depart from that presumption. 
The reasons for advocating these views have nothing whatsoever to do with 
the inherent capabilities of those who work in the private or public sectors – far 
from it. There are, however, other good reasons. The United Kingdom has a large 
number of highly sophisticated commercial and corporate lawyers. The transac-
tional lawyers amongst them (and that is a very substantial majority of them) deal 
with vastly more relevant cases through which corporate structures are created or 
refined than do the policy-makers and lawyers in the public sector. Transactional 
lawyers also deal with each case in much greater detail, and with far greater 
intensity than Parliament – or any legislature – possibly could. Again, there are 
far more transactional lawyers, who collectively (and sometimes individually) 
possess far greater resources (in terms of time, finance and information) than 
those dealing with internal corporate structures in the public sector. Transactional 
lawyers also spread their expertise swiftly when designing new structures through 
which shareholders participate in companies, so that evolution of new forms is 
fast and vigorous. This is partly because the relevant specialist lawyers operate 
mostly within an interconnected community, the City of London, where new 
developments spread quickly,87 but partly also because the results of their work, 
articles of association, are publicly available from Companies House (and now 
via the internet), so that anyone interested has immediate access to an exact 
record of new developments for the nominal sum of £1 per downloaded copy.88 
—————————————————— 
85  Note the distinctions between private and public companies in Companies Act 1985, Part 
IX, chapter IV. 
86  See the above discussion of unintentional regulation based on outdated assumptions. 
87  For a highly pertinent example of this process, consider the rapid spread of techniques 
(discussed below) for enfranchising the holders of depositary receipts backed by shares of 
companies incorporated in Britain. From BP plc adopting this technique in December 1998, it 
spread rapidly to other companies. See further Nolan, loc. cit. n. 7. 
88  See: <http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk> and <http://direct.companieshouse.gov.uk>. 
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All this adds up to the very vigorous evolution of internal corporate structures 
through the frequent interaction of private parties, and the rather less frequent 
interactions of those parties with state or Community entities, such as the courts, 
the Parliaments (national and European) and the Commission. This system for 
creating and developing the internal structures of companies acknowledges that 
law, and the arrangements made pursuant to law, are necessarily provisional, and 
will need to evolve, because law, and the arrangements made pursuant to it, are 
founded on bounded information and rationality deployed in an ever-changing 
context. In other words, the system rests on pragmatic, rather than idealistic, 
assumptions about the process of forming legal structures.89 This approach is, it 
appears, shared by the Commission.90 (The question of how the goals of the law 
are, and should be, set is another matter, but one which is settled for the moment 
as regards company law in the United Kingdom.91.) Consequently, the system 
allows for trial – and error. It demands a minimum acceptance of the risk that 
there may be undesirable results. Yet would modern corporate law (let alone 
contract law) exist if an aversion to risk had always governed the law? It is highly 
unlikely. Risk is the inescapable cost of innovation. 
 
 
4. NON-SHAREHOLDERS – INDIRECT INVESTORS – IN BRITISH COMPANIES 
 
As it happens, a particularly good example of innovative practice in British 
companies, and a subsequent legislative response, is the enfranchisement of 
indirect investors. (Indirect investors have the registered title to shares held for 
them by an intermediary, often a bank or other institution acting as a nominee or 
depositary.) Lawyers in private practice, without waiting for legislative interven-
tion, pressed old techniques (.proxy voting) into new service, to give indirect 
investors an effective voice in companies. Now Parliament (in the United 
Kingdom) is enacting reforms to simplify the means of enfranchising indirect 
investors.92 The state, acting through Parliament, has learnt from the experiments 
of lawyers in private practice and the structures they created to enfranchise 
indirect investors. As a result, Parliament can now build on that experience to 
create new, improved and simpler means of enfranchising indirect investors. This 
section examines and explains these developments in rather more detail. 
 
—————————————————— 
89  Note D. Goddard, ‘Company Law Reform – Lessons from the New Zealand Experi-
ence’, 16 Company and Securities Law Journal (1998) p. 236 at n. 42. 
90  Note, for example, the speech of Commissioner McCreevy, ‘The Future of the Company 
Law Action Plan’, Speech/05/702 (17 November 2005). 
91  See n. 82 above. 
92  See clauses Part 9 of the Companies Bill. 
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4.1 The problem 
 
There is a basic problem when shares are registered in the name of an intermedi-
ary (such as a depositary) on behalf of someone else. In those circumstances, the 
power to act as a responsible shareholder and the economic incentives to act as 
such are divided. The registered, non-beneficial owner of shares (the intermedi-
ary) has all the powers and privileges attaching to those shares as against the 
company which issued them, but little incentive to use the powers unless the 
indirect investor can and does demand their exercise. This is because any advan-
tage of exercising the powers will accrue to the indirect investor in the shares, not 
to their registered owner. By contrast, the indirect investor may have great 
economic incentive to see that the powers are exercised, in order to secure its own 
well-being, but the indirect investor has no direct rights against the company 
simply by virtue of its investment. 
 
4.1.1 The relevant law 
 
The law which brings about this result is easily understood, and there are per-
fectly sound reasons for it. The question is whether it is possible to respect those 
reasons and yet still allow a greater role for indirect investors in companies. 
The registered owner of shares in a British company is entitled to all the pow-
ers and privileges attaching to the shares simply by being a member of the 
company.93 As against the company, any trust or other arrangement affecting the 
shares does not alter that fact. This result is brought about by a combination of 
statute law and provisions which may be (and, so far as the author is aware, 
always are) found in a company’s articles of association. 
The relevant statute law is section 360 of the Companies Act 1985, which re-
enacts earlier provisions in the same general terms going back to section 30 of the 
Companies Act 1862. Section 360 provides that: 
 
No notice of any trust, express, implied or constructive, shall be entered on the 
register, or be receivable by the registrar, in the case of companies registered in 
England and Wales. 
 
Regulation 5 of Table A (1985) is a typical example of the sort of provision in a 
company’s articles of association that supplements section 360: 
 
Except as required by law, no person shall be recognised by the company as 
holding any share upon any trust and (except as otherwise provided by the 
articles or by law) the company shall not be bound by or recognise any interest 
in any share except an absolute right to the entirety thereof in the holder. 
—————————————————— 
93  This is because it is a party to the company’s articles, its constitutional contract, by 
virtue of Companies Act 1985, s. 14, as supplemented by s. 22. 
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These provisions allow a company to register a transfer of shares without refer-
ence of any trust affecting them,94 and to remain unaffected by relations between 
the trustee of shares and their beneficiary,95 unless the company intermeddles in 
the trust.96 Nevertheless, when the company claims some interest in its own shares 
(such as a lien), these provisions do not allow the company to assert its rights in 
the shares free of other people’s rights in those shares.97 
 
4.1.2 The reasons for the law 
 
There is a good reason for section 360 and articles such as regulation 5: they 
facilitate a company’s administration of its own shares.98 If there were no such 
provisions, any transfer of shares which a company has to register might result in 
the company being sued over some breach of duty relating to the transfer. Again, 
if there were no such provision, a company might easily become embroiled in a 
dispute between the trustees and beneficiaries of some shares about the way in 
which votes attaching to the shares were cast. Nevertheless, the present law does 
not leave the mere beneficiary of shares unprotected: the beneficiary can always 
take court action to protect his or her rights and, in the mean time, seek a stop 
order or notice to prevent or regulate any dealings with the shares.99 
The precise converse of the almost exclusive relationship between company 
and registered shareholder is the virtual absence of any relationship between the 
company and an indirect investor in its shares: the indirect investor, as such, has 
no rights of management in the company. Nevertheless, the present law allows 
essentially two means through which that indirect investor can bring influence to 
bear on the company. First, the indirect investor, if absolutely entitled as against 
the registered owner, can instruct the registered owner how to deal with the 
shares.100 (If needs be, in cases where the registered owner of shares holds for 
someone who, in turn, holds his or her rights in the shares for someone else, then 
instructions can be passed up the chain of those interested in the shares, from the 
—————————————————— 
94  Société Générale de Paris v. Walker (1885) 11 App. Cas. 20. 
95  In re Perkins (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 613. 
96  See, generally, Snell’s Equity (London, 2005) at §§ [28-45]-[28-46]. 
97  Bradford Banking Co v. Briggs & Co (1886) 12 App. Cas. 29; Mackereth v. Wigan Coal 
& Iron Co Ltd [1916] 2 Ch. 293. 
98  See Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22 at p. 55, per Lord Davey. 
99  See Part 73 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
100  Kirby v. Wilkins [1929] 2 Ch. 444 at p. 454, per Romer J. Pending any instructions 
about voting from the beneficial owner, the registered holder can vote the shares in the 
beneficiary’s interests: see ibid. To the extent that Butt v. Kelson [1952] Ch. 197 casts doubt on 
the latter proposition, it must be regarded as inconsistent with the fundamental principle that the 
trustees manage the trust estate impartially, of their own motion and for the benefit of all the 
beneficiaries, a principle restated in Nestle v. National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 
118 at p. 135, per Staughton LJ. 
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beneficiary with the ultimate right to direct how votes are cast through to the 
registered owner who will actually cast the votes.) Secondly, the registered owner 
may appoint the indirect investor as a proxy in respect of the shares, with discre-
tion as to how the votes attaching to the shares should be cast.101 The current 
means of enfranchising indirect investors in a company press these two well-
established legal mechanisms into service, and the next part of this article will 
show just how they do so. 
 
4.2 The solutions 
 
Section 360 of the Companies Act 1985 does not stop a company from appreciat-
ing a factual situation – that its shares are held by intermediaries – and making 
provision accordingly to empower those for whom the intermediaries hold the 
shares. Several companies have now done so.102 BP plc is a good example of such 
a company, and it was one of the first companies to make such provision. 
 
4.2.1 Enfranchising indirect investors using proxies 
 
Many of BP’s shares are registered in the name of JPMorgan Chase Bank, which 
holds them as a depositary and has issued depositary receipts for them (American 
Depositary Shares or ADSs) to investors.103 Many of these ADSs are the result of 
BP’s acquisition of two American companies, Amoco in 1998 and ARCO in 
1999, which involved equity swaps. In those deals, BP issued ADSs (rather than 
ordinary shares) for two main reasons: issuing ADSs mitigated the impact of US 
securities regulation and it created a security denominated in US dollars, which is 
more marketable in the United States than shares denominated in sterling. 
Nevertheless, BP has been very keen to enfranchise the holders of ADSs and to 
treat them for governance purposes as much as possible like registered sharehold-
ers.104 Consequently, BP’s articles provide that the ‘Approved Depositary’ 
(currently JPMorgan Chase Bank) appoints each holder of ADSs as its proxy in 
respect of ordinary shares which are held by (or for) the Approved Depositary and 
are equivalent in number to the shares represented by those ADSs. Such a proxy 
is entitled essentially to all the rights of a registered shareholder in BP, including 
—————————————————— 
101  Recall that section 372 of the Companies Act 1985 ensures that a shareholder will al-
ways have the right to appoint a proxy. 
102  See generally Nolan, loc. cit. n. 7. 
103  See: <http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=2010213&contentId=2014 
600>. 
104  Ibid. Precisely equivalent treatment is not possible, because of differences in securities 
regulation between the United Kingdom and the United States. For example, rules differ 
between the two countries about when a company can set its record date for determining who is 
entitled to vote at a particular company general meeting. 
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the right to receive notices and documents, the right to delegate powers by 
appointing a further proxy, and the right to use BP’s sophisticated legal and 
technical provisions for electronic voting.105 However, the ADS holders are not 
party to the statutory contract by which the articles are given effect,106 and so 
cannot claim rights under the articles. Nevertheless, BP’s articles are backed by 
contractual arrangements between BP and JPMorgan Chase Bank, which ensure 
that the Approved Depositary will allow ADS holders to take advantage of the 
governance opportunities afforded by those articles. 
BP’s articles (Art. 161) and the additional contractual arrangements between 
BP and JPMorgan Chase Bank also provide for the Approved Depositary to 
manage the ADS system, so that: 
 
JPMorgan Chase Bank … as the BP ADR depositary performs the roles of the 
transfer agent, registrar, record-keeper and dividend paying agent. JPMorgan 
Chase also coordinates the proxy voting process and arranges for custody of 
the BP Ordinary shares underlying the BP ADS shares and manages the proc-
ess of exchanging Amoco and ARCO common shares into BP ADS shares.107  
 
The Approved Depositary can then provide BP with the information it needs to 
manage and verify the voting process at any company meeting: the identities of 
those who hold ADSs on the relevant record date; the number of ADSs each of 
them holds at that time; the votes to which each is then entitled at the meeting by 
virtue of the Approved Depositary’s delegation of its voting powers; the identity 
of any proxy appointed by the holder of ADSs; and so forth.108 
This system for enfranchising direct investors clearly works, and it has been 
adopted by a number of leading British companies for a variety of reasons.109 A 
working system today is of far greater utility to the end-users of corporate 
vehicles than endless mere theorising, however elegant. Yet the system has draw-
backs. First, it is necessarily a little clumsy, given the basic problem that share-
holder rights in a British company emanate from, and must be derived from, the 
shareholder who is a party to the company’s articles of association by virtue of 
sections 14 and 22 of the Companies Act 1985. For this reason, a shareholder has 
to delegate rights through a proxy mechanism to indirect investors. Secondly, it is 
only practically possible to enfranchise one identifiable tier of indirect investors 
using this system. A shareholder (the depositary or other primary intermediary) 
maintains a list of indirect investors in its shares. That list in turn determines 
which indirect investors are enfranchised as proxies of the shareholder. Yet the 
—————————————————— 
105  See the current version of BP’s Articles of Association at Articles 157-170. 
106  Companies Act 1985, s. 14. 
107  See n. 103 above. 
108  See n. 105 above. 
109  See Nolan, loc. cit. n. 7, Appendix 1. 
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shareholder can only put on the list those who own entitlements as against it. It 
cannot practically discover, verify and record every sub-entitlement. So, where a 
shareholder owns shares on behalf of indirect investor A, and indirect investor A 
holds its entitlement to the order of indirect investor B, the system will operate to 
enfranchise indirect investor A, rather than the ultimate economic interest-holder, 
namely indirect investor B, because there is no practical way that the shareholder 
can necessarily discover B’s existence and entitlement, at least without very 
onerous enquiries. This problem can, of course, be expanded beyond two layers 
of indirect investors. 
The first of these drawbacks – the slight technical (or even aesthetic) inele-
gance of enfranchising indirect investors through a proxy mechanism – will be 
resolved in the United Kingdom when clause 145 of the Companies Bill are 
enacted and brought into force. This clause will allow the owner of shares to 
nominate another person (in practice, likely to be an indirect investor) to exercise 
the governance rights attached to the shares in question.110 The second drawback – 
the difficulties of enfranchising the second and more remote tiers of indirect 
investors – can be resolved by reforming the relationship between intermediaries 
and indirect investors. 
 
4.2.2 Enfranchising indirect investors through their intermediaries 
 
If a nominee or depositary (an intermediary) who holds shares takes voting 
instructions from his or her beneficiary, and then acts on those instructions, the 
beneficiary (the indirect investor) is effectively enfranchised. If the beneficiary in 
turn holds for someone else, then he or she too could take instructions from his or 
her principal, and so on. This method of enfranchising indirect investors is 
already possible: English law already allows a beneficiary to give instructions to 
his or her nominee.111 Equally, if a nominee who holds shares grants a proxy to 
his or her beneficiary, the beneficiary is effectively enfranchised. Again, the 
delegation of the proxy could go further if the beneficiary in turn holds his or her 
rights for someone else. However, the mere existence of these possibilities may 
not be adequate to enfranchise indirect investors in shares. It may well be 
necessary to put further pressure on intermediaries to realise those possibilities: at 
present, for example, even where an intermediary is instructed to vote shares held 
for an investor, the instructions are not always duly executed.112 
—————————————————— 
110  This reform adopts and very closely follows the suggestions made in Nolan, loc. cit. n. 
7, at pp. 93-96. However, the reforms do still contain coercive powers to compel companies to 
avail themselves of the new provisions, and those powers remain politically questionable: see 
ibid., at pp. 96-99. 
111  See n. 100 above. 
112  See the Report of the Committee of Enquiry into UK Vote Execution (London, National 
Association of Pension Funds 1999) § 1.7; and Myners, op. cit. n. 80. 
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It is perfectly practical to require intermediaries to seek instructions from the 
investors from whom they hold shares (or rights to shares), and it will likely 
become easier still in the near future, with the continuing, and very rapid, improve-
ment in electronic communications. As the UK Company Law Review noted, 
 
it was put to us that, at least in regard to the right to vote, practical advances in 
the use of electronic technology would very soon make it feasible, at low cost, 
for the intermediary who is the registered holder to collect diverse instructions 
from beneficial owners, reflect them accurately in proxy voting instructions 
passed to the company registrar, and obtain and pass back to the beneficial 
owners confirmation that the votes had been recorded.113 
 
As well as being practical, this suggestion is economically appropriate. First, 
the intermediary already will, or should have, all the information about the 
beneficial owners of the shares (or rights) it holds and whether any particular 
beneficiary is absolutely entitled to those shares (or rights) so as to claim control 
over the governance powers attached to the shares (or rights). This is because one 
of the most basic duties of a trustee is to know his or her trust.114 Furthermore, if 
an intermediary is regulated by the Financial Services Authority (.FSA) under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,115 the intermediary will also need to 
know about its client (the indirect investor) and communicate with the client in 
order to comply with the FSA’s Principles for Business.116 So, in contrast to the 
company concerned, the intermediary would not be put to much (if any) extra 
expense were it required to know which of its beneficiaries – which investors – 
should exercise governance powers in respect of shares (or rights) held by the 
intermediary. Secondly, though there would undoubtedly be additional costs in 
compelling the intermediary to pass on communications from companies to 
investors, and in turn pass on instructions from investors to companies, those 
costs would be borne either by the intermediary or by the investor, as is wholly 
appropriate in cases where one or more of them (rather than the company which 
issued shares) is actually responsible for the shares being held through intermedi-
aries. 
—————————————————— 
113  Company Law Reform: Final Report, Vol. 1 (London, 2001) § 7.3. 
114  A. Underhill and D.J. Hayton, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (London, Butterworths 
2003) pp. 466-467. 
115  Financial intermediaries will be prima facie subject to regulation by the FSA, because 
they will conduct a business which requires authorisation from the FSA, see Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000, supply security. 19, 22, 23, 31, Part IV and Schedule 2, Part I. Under 
Art. 66 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (SI 
2001/544) a few intermediaries might be exempted from regulation by the FSA, but it unlikely 
that many firms whose business includes acting as a financial intermediary will fall within this 
exemption. 
116  The Principles for Businesses Instrument 2001. 
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In fact, these extra costs might not be so very great. Trustees are already under 
duties to communicate with a beneficiary when a capital or income payment 
becomes due to the beneficiary.117 Furthermore, the FSA’s Principles for Businesses 
require appropriate communication between intermediary and client.118 So the new 
duties on intermediaries, outlined above, would simply increase the number of 
communications between people who should already be in touch with each other. 
These are also solutions that have found favour in the United States. The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) generally requires a nominee who 
holds securities to forward information received about those securities (annual 
reports, etc.) to each beneficiary for whom the nominee holds. In addition, for the 
purposes of any meeting of the company which issued the securities, the SEC 
requires the nominee to grant (or effectively transfer) a proxy to the beneficiary, 
or else to solicit voting instructions from the beneficiary and then act on such 
instructions as are given.119 
 
 
5. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
 
The examples and arguments put forward in the preceding sections have not 
sought to deny any role for public authorities in regulating or structuring the 
internal affairs of companies. Yet they do have implications which concern the 
incidence, extent and form of any such regulation. These implications are directly 
relevant to an evaluation of the Draft Shareholder Rights Directive. 
Shareholders in a British company can, to a very great extent, establish and 
mould their rights in their company, and the means through which those rights are 
expressed. Indeed, they can make some very useful (if not comprehensive) pro-
vision to enfranchise indirect investors in the company. The shareholders’ choices 
are legally expressed in the company’s articles of association. In present circum-
stances, shareholders are regularly amending the articles of their company in 
response to new technological developments and in response to new developments 
—————————————————— 
117  Underhill and Hayton, op. cit. n. 114, pp. 610-611. The duty may not arise when there is 
no need for a trustee to inform a beneficiary of some entitlement to a payment, because the 
beneficiary will already know about it, for example, when a payment is made directly to the 
beneficiary pursuant to a mandate from the trustee. 
118  The Principles for Businesses Instrument 2001, Principle 7. The more detailed require-
ments for communication, set out in chapter 8 of the FSA’s Conduct of Business Rules 
(Conduct of Business Sourcebook Instrument 2001), may well not apply to an intermediary 
because of chapter 11 of those rules. 
119  See rule 14b-2(b)(3) of the General Rules and Regulations promulgated under the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934, discussed in S.M. Klein, ‘Rule 14b-2: Does it Actually Lead to the 
Prompt Forwarding of Communications to Beneficial Owners of Securities?’, 23 Journal of 
Corporation Law (1997) p. 155 and L. Loss and J. Seligman, Securities Regulation (New York, 
Aspen 2001) § 6-C-6. 
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of legal practice observed in other companies.120 General experience suggests that 
this pace of change is unlikely to slacken. Yet the nature of any relevant change is 
very hard to foresee. Twenty years ago, who would have imagined the internet or 
its present importance? In other words, corporate practice is in the early stages of 
evolving in response to a series of new demands on it, and this evolution is likely 
to continue for some time. 
The appropriate legislative and regulatory response should therefore accom-
modate the ongoing evolution of corporate practice, in order to promote the 
acknowledged goal of corporate law reform – the facilitation of modern, respon-
sible, competitive business within the Single Market.121 It should do this first by 
retaining the basic facultative principles of UK corporate law, derived from our 
nineteenth century forebears, who themselves lived in equally fast-changing 
times. These principles allow participants in a company, and their advisors, to 
adapt the arrangements they make for their governance of the company to meet 
new and often unforeseen developments. Unfortunately, legislators have in the 
past often proceeded by enacting specific solutions, which are often cumbersome, 
or at least limiting, and can only be adapted by further legislation.122 Equally, 
regulation should not consist of any general codification of how shareholders in a 
company, and any indirect investors in the company, should engage with each 
other and with managers of the company. The structures through which share-
holders (and indirect investors) participate in companies are developing rapidly in 
response to many new stimuli, and this looks set to continue indefinitely. Conse-
quently, any such project of codification is entirely inappropriate at present and 
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. 
The response of regulation should also involve specific legislation or regulation 
where necessary to address specific problems revealed by experience. In order to 
avoid creating implicit and often unintended barriers to innovation, it should also be 
—————————————————— 
120  This is immediately apparent from the author’s own survey of FTSE 100 articles of 
association (see n. 16 above): 89 per cent of the articles surveyed had been adopted or amended 
in the previous four years. 
121  See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Par-
liament, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
Union – A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final. 
122  For example, consider the reforms introduced by Companies Act 1985, ss. 381A-381C 
and Schedule 15A (unanimous written resolutions). The amendments to the law governing the 
use of electronic communications in relation to general meetings (see the legislative amend-
ments made by the Companies Act 1985 (Electronic Communications) Order 2000 (SI 
2000/3373)) also form a specific solution to a problem and may well in time become restrictive, 
as anticipated by the Company Law Review: see the Company Law Review, Strategic 
Framework, op. cit. n. 82, at § 5.7.19; Completing the Structure, op. cit. n. 82, at § 5.39; and 
Final Report, op. cit. n. 113, at § 7.11. The temptation to enact specific legislation is not unique 
to the United Kingdom: in Australia, see Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, 
Shareholder Participation in the Modern Listed Company: Final Report (Sydney, 2000) pp. 
63-74; in Delaware, see General Corporations Law, § 211. 
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careful that legislation and regulation – and the definitions used in them – do not 
rest on assumptions that are outmoded, or may quickly become so. In particular, it 
should be very cautious of regulating the means by which shareholders participate 
in companies, because those means are now in such a state of flux. 
In theoretical terms, the point is that inductive, minimally categorising, ‘bot-
tom up’ methods of rule making were used in the earlier stages of developing a 
system, when understanding of the system was sketchy, and deductive, generally 
categorising, ‘top down’ methods were used once a significant body of knowl-
edge had accumulated to form the premises in this process of reasoning.123 There 
is much to commend such an approach: it takes account of the varying – let it be 
hoped expanding – boundaries of knowledge; it accepts that hasty intervention, in 
ignorance, can stifle innovation and even be counterproductive; but it also accepts 
that there is a very useful role for legislation and regulation to clarify the law and 
to deal in a principled fashion with the problems revealed by experience rather 
than by conjecture, however well informed. 
 
 
6. THE DRAFT SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE 
 
The Draft Shareholder Rights Directive adopts the pattern of regulation which the 
UK government has adopted hitherto in relation to British companies. The 
Directive does not affect the basic means by which the corporate law of a 
Member State provides for the rights of shareholders in a company incorporated 
under the laws of that state. In Britain, therefore, the fundamentally contractual 
model will continue,124 subject to regulation of which, in due course, laws 
implementing the Directive will form a part. In fact, current regulation deals with 
most of the stipulations in the Directive: the Directive will require surprisingly 
little by way of implementation in the United Kingdom. In order to demonstrate 
this, it is necessary to examine the substantive provisions of the Directive, found 
in its second chapter (Arts. 4-15 inclusive). 
 
6.1 Provisions of the Directive which will necessitate little or no change 
to the law in the United Kingdom 
 
6.1.1 Article 4 
 
Article 4 provides for the equal treatment of shareholders in the same position 
within a listed company. This is already established by rule 9.3.1 of the Listing 
—————————————————— 
123  As regards the different types of rule, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1994) pp. 124-136. 
124  Clauses 34 and 112 of the Companies Bill will continue the effect of sections 14 and 22 
of the Companies Act 1985. 
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Rules, implementing Article 65(1) of the Combined Admissions and Reporting 
Directive.125 
 
6.1.2 Article 5 
 
Article 5 of the Directive (general meeting notice) will make a few minor changes 
to the present state of the law in Britain. Article 5(1) will increase the minimum 
length of notice for general meetings of shareholders to thirty days. Presently, the 
minimum for a limited company is twenty-one days in the case of an annual 
general meeting or in the case of a meeting at which a special resolution will be 
put.126 This increase has been criticised in Parliament in the United Kingdom127 as 
making notice requirements too lengthy for a general meeting of a listed com-
pany. This criticism may be overstated in the light of corporate practice. In 
reality, given number of a listed company’s shareholders, and the time it takes to 
print and circulate a notice of meeting (and any accompanying documentation) to 
such a number of shareholders, it is impossible to call a meeting of a listed 
company with any great haste. The difference between twenty-one days and thirty 
days is not, in that context, so very great. Still, neither is there any great reason to 
prefer thirty days’ notice over twenty-one. 
Article 5(2)(a)-(d) deals with the contents of a notice of meeting.128 It makes 
very little difference, if any, to the requirements of the common law,129 as 
supplemented for listed companies by rule 9.3.3 of the Listing Rules. Articles 
5(2)(e) and 5(3) require a notice to contain the relevant company’s internet 
address and also require certain information about the company and the meeting 
to be posted on the company’s website. That is not required by existing law or 
regulation in the United Kingdom, but it is good (indeed very common) practice 
already.130 So Article 5 will make very few changes to the law in Britain, and even 
fewer changes to the existing practice of listed companies. 
—————————————————— 
125  Directive 2001/34/EC. 
126  See Companies Act 1985, ss. 369, 378. This will change (for public companies, and 
therefore for listed companies) under clause 314 of the Companies Bill to twenty-one days’ 
notice for an annual general meeting and fourteen days’ notice in other cases where no specific 
requirement is imposed. 
127  Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Nineteenth Report, at § 4.15. 
128  Very briefly, Art. 5(2)(a)-(d) will require the notice of meeting to state the time, place 
and agenda of the meeting; formalities and record dates that establish entitlements to vote at the 
meeting; the means by which shareholders can participate in the meeting, and how to discover 
the full text of resolutions to be proposed at the meeting. 
129  See Shearman, op. cit. n. 26, chapter 5. The basic common law requirements for the 
contents of a notice will be codified by clause 318 of the Companies Bill. See also clause 344 
of the Bill as regards public companies. 
130  At the time of writing, see, e.g., <http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?category 
Id=9007311&contentId=7015211> in relation to BP plc’s 2006 annual general meeting. 
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6.1.3 Article 6 
 
Article 6 (agenda and resolutions) will make a small technical change to the 
minimum stake for a shareholder (or shareholders acting together) to add business 
or resolutions to the agenda of a listed company’s general meeting. In so far as 
annual general meetings are concerned, the current minimum in Britain is 5 per 
cent of the total voting rights in the company concerned, or at least 100 share-
holders who, on average, have paid up at least £100 in respect of their shares.131 
Article 6 will change this to a minimum equal to 5 per cent of share capital (not 5 
per cent of voting rights which, given the possibility of differential voting rights, 
may not be equivalent) or a stake with a minimum nominal value of €10 million, 
whichever is lower. This could hardly be called a major change. Slightly greater 
change will affect other general meetings. At present, there is no right to add 
business to such meetings. Such a right will have to be introduced into the United 
Kingdom’s company law in order to implement Article 6. At present, the only 
relevant right is for members holding at least 10 per cent of a company’s voting 
capital to procure a general meeting which will then consider such business as 
they see fit.132 
 
6.1.4 Articles 7 and 8 
 
Articles 7 and 8 call for very little comment. Article 7 (admission to the general 
meeting) is generally consistent with existing practice in the United Kingdom. 
There is one issue that merits comment. This concerns how a company may set a 
record date by reference to which it determines who is entitled to cast the votes 
attaching to a share. At present, this is a matter entirely for a company’s arti-
cles,133 save where the company makes use of the CREST electronic settlement 
system for dealings in their shares, in which case a record date can be no more 
than forty-eight hours before the time fixed for the meeting in question.134 In order 
to implement Article 7(3), therefore, law in the United Kingdom will for the first 
time have to specify a general maximum limit for record dates, a limit of less than 
—————————————————— 
131  As regards annual general meetings, see Companies Act 1985, ss. 376-377. See also the 
continuation of these minima for public companies (and thus for listed companies) in clauses 
345-347 of the Companies Bill. 
132  Companies Act 1985, s. 368, whose effect will be continued by clauses 310-312 of the 
Companies Bill. 
133  See, e.g., BP plc, Art. 60(D). The only generally applicable statutory provision of even 
tangential relevance to the ascertainment of rights to cast the votes attached to shares is 
Companies Act 1985, s. 372(5). That sub-section renders void any provision in a company’s 
articles which requires the deposit of proxy documentation more than forty-eight hours in 
advance of the meeting to which it relates. 
134  Uncertificated Securities Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/3272) reg. 34(1). 
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thirty days in advance of the relevant meeting. Though this will be a change in the 
law, it need not affect current practice.135 
The UK government is unhappy that a record date could be set so far in ad-
vance of a meeting – indeed, as early as the very day on which notice of the 
meeting is given.136 This could cause practical problems with ‘stock lending’, as it 
is known. If shares were temporarily registered in one person’s name, pursuant to 
a contract to lend the shares for a specified period, and notice of a meeting were 
given on the record date, the shares could not be subsequently retrieved and voted 
by their original owner: even as notice of the meeting was given, it would be too 
late to transfer the shares so that the recipient could cast the votes attached to 
them. This is a fair criticism of a very generous provision for record dates well in 
advance of the meetings to which they apply. However, from a purely national 
perspective, the UK government could always impose a more stringent require-
ment on British companies that the time between record date and meeting should 
be much shorter – perhaps as short as the present UK standard of forty-eight 
hours. The Directive is, after all, a minimum harmonisation directive.137 
Article 8 (.participation in the general meeting by electronic means) is already 
reflected in the common law.138 Nevertheless, out of caution, the government 
might seek to clarify the law. 
 
6.1.5 Article 10 
 
The effect of Article 10 (.proxy voting) is largely prefigured by section 372 of the 
Companies Act 1985. That section, however, does not give proxies in a public 
company the right to speak at a meeting, though a public company’s articles of 
association frequently do.139 However, all proxies will soon have a statutory right 
to speak at a meeting,140 which will make law in the United Kingdom comply with 
Article 10(3) in so far as that grants proxies the right to speak at meetings. 
 
6.1.6 Article 11 
 
Article 11 (appointment of proxy holders) will require some widening of the 
current regulation of restrictions on the appointment of proxy holders. The present 
provisions forbid a company’s articles from requiring that documents relating to 
the appointment of a proxy be submitted to it (or anyone else) more than forty-
—————————————————— 
135  See, e.g., n. 130 above. 
136  Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Nineteenth Report, at § 4.16. 
137  See Art. 3 of the Directive. 
138  Byng v. London Life [1990] Ch. 170. 
139  See, e.g., BP plc, Art. 85(C). 
140  See clause 331 of the Companies Bill. 
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eight hours in advance of the meeting in question.141 Article 11 will require a 
more general prohibition on excessive formalities relating to the appointment of 
proxy holders. 
 
6.1.7 Article 13 
 
Article 13 (voting upon instructions) is the final substantive provision of the 
Directive. It requires little comment. From a British perspective, there is not much 
new in this article. That will be clear from the previous discussion of the means 
through which indirect investors can bring their influence to bear on a company in 
whose shares they are interested. 
 The only aspect of Article 13 worthy of note for the purposes of implementing 
the Directive in the United Kingdom is Article 13(4). This provision requires that 
an entity holding shares for various beneficiaries should be able to split its votes 
to reflect the differing voting instructions of different beneficiaries. Currently, 
there is no mandatory legal provision to this effect in Britain; that will have to 
change once the Directive is adopted. Indeed, the statutory provision for voting by 
the representatives of corporate shareholders seems (on one reading, at least) to 
deny the possibility of a split vote by a single corporate shareholder.142 That is not 
the end of the matter, however. The present law is sufficiently ambiguous to 
allow someone chairing a company’s general meeting to take a different view and 
allow such a split vote, though that may generate practical problems, such as 
ensuring that the right number of votes is cast, and not too many.143 Furthermore, 
a company’s own articles can make provision to allow for this sort of split vote: 
they can, for example, allow a single corporate shareholder to appoint several 
representatives at the company’s general meeting, each in respect of a tranche of 
shares in the company, so that each representative can reflect the views of 
particular indirect investors in the company.144 Finally, a single proxy holder can 
cast his appointor’s votes in different ways if instructed to do so.145 That means a 
—————————————————— 
141  Companies Act 1985, s. 372(5), to be largely re-enacted (with some minor modifica-
tions) by clause 334 of the Companies Bill. 
142  Companies Act 1985, s. 375. 
143  Myners, op. cit. n. 80, at p. 27. See also the guidance ‘Corporate Representation at 
General Meetings’, produced by the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators, 
available at: <http://www.icsa.org.uk/images/pdf/Guidence/040310.pdf>. The result of a vote, 
even where there has been an irregularity in the vote, is usually protected from subsequent 
challenge by a company’s articles: see, e.g., Table A (1985) reg. 58 and BP plc Art. 80. 
144  See, e.g., Amersham plc, Art. 80. Rather surprisingly, clause 330 of the Companies Bill, 
which does allow a corporate shareholder in a company to appoint more than one representative 
at the company’s general meetings, apparently does not allow those representatives to cast 
votes in different ways, because of clause 330(4)(b). 
145  Companies Act 1985, s. 374, which applies to the member’s voting rights whether the 
member casts his votes personally or through a proxy. 
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registered holder of shares who wishes to reflect the differing views of various 
beneficiaries interested in those shares can appoint a proxy to cast some votes 
attaching to the shares one way, and some another. Still, Article 13(4) will require 
a change to the existing law in Britain to ensure that all listed companies recog-
nise split votes cast by the representative of a corporate shareholder. 
 
6.1.8 Summary 
 
None of the provisions so far merit much normative comment from a British 
perspective. In general, they are all consistent with the basic contractual, but 
regulated, framework of shareholder rights in British companies. In their specific 
provisions, either they make no change to the present law (or at least to common 
present practice within that law), or else they make only minor changes to aspects 
of regulation or practice which, in their broad outline at least, are already well 
known and accepted in the United Kingdom. 
 
6.2 Provisions of the Directive which will necessitate more significant 
change to the law in the United Kingdom 
 
Three provisions of the Directive merit more substantial comment, however. 
These are Articles 9, 12 and 15. 
 
6.2.1 Article 9 
 
Article 9 of the Directive will introduce a generalised right for shareholders to ask 
questions at their company’s general meetings. Such questions would normally be 
directed at the company’s management. As a generalised right, this would be an 
innovation for company law in Britain. The word ‘generalised’ is very important, 
however. While company law in Britain may not include a single right for 
shareholders to ask questions at a general meeting of their company, it is com-
pletely untrue that shareholders have no rights to ask such questions. As well as 
their legal rights, of course, they have their economic power, and they can use 
that to ensure that directors answer their questions. A little more explanation is 
nevertheless useful, because the relevant law, regulation and practice are not 
terribly well known, even in the United Kingdom itself. 
At common law, the members of a company in general meeting have a right to 
debate the business of the meeting.146 That might seem a much narrower right 
than a general right to ask questions, but the right must be seen in the context of 
the business that has to be done at a listed company’s general meetings, particu-
larly at its annual general meetings. A listed company has to lay before each 
—————————————————— 
146  See, e.g., Wall v. London & Northern Assets Corporation Ltd. [1898] 2 Ch. 469. 
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annual general meeting its annual accounts, the directors’ report for the year, the 
report on its directors’ remuneration, as well as a report by the company’s 
auditors on the accounts, directors’ report and relevant parts of the remuneration 
report.147 Discussion of these documents will, therefore, necessarily form part of 
the business of the meeting, on which members may comment and raise ques-
tions. The contents of these various documents, taken together, are so wide-
ranging, and will cover such a huge part of the company’s activities, that the 
members will consequently be able to speak and ask questions about virtually any 
aspect of the company’s affairs. Other likely business at the annual general 
meeting, such as the election or re-election of directors,148 will likewise permit a 
huge range of questions from members. Furthermore, the Companies Bill will 
introduce a requirement for every listed company to produce a ‘Business Re-
view’,149 which will involve ‘forward-looking reporting’ and be laid before the 
company’s general meeting.150 This will increase still further the scope of the 
business before that meeting and correspondingly increase scope of shareholders’ 
rights to speak and ask questions at the meeting. How much of an increase this 
will be is another matter. Modern directors’ reports deal with a huge range of the 
company’s affairs, so the increase may well not amount to much. 
Of course, these rights of shareholders are common law default rights. In prin-
ciple, this means that they could be modified or abrogated by the contractual 
counter-stipulation of the shareholders in a company, in other words, by the 
company’s articles of association. In practice, such modification or abrogation is 
never encountered.151 More importantly, perhaps, any such modification would be 
contrary to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance, which applies to listed 
companies.152 Indeed, a company’s articles may expand the opportunities for 
shareholders to ask questions at a meeting of their company, for example by 
establishing the possibility of purely consultative meetings at which no decisions 
will be taken.153 Adherence to publicly established best practice will likewise 
ensure that shareholders have ample opportunity to raise questions at a general 
meeting of the company.154 The gap between Article 9 and current law and 
—————————————————— 
147  Companies Act 1985, s. 241. There has to be a (non-binding) vote by members of a 
company on the directors’ remuneration report for the company’s preceding year: Companies 
Act 1985, s. 241A. 
148  See Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Lon-
don, 2003), which applies to all companies listed in the United Kingdom, at § A.7. 
149  See clause 423(5) of the Companies Bill. 
150  See clauses 445-446 of the Companies Bill. 
151  The author has never encountered such abrogation or modification either in his aca-
demic study of FTSE 100 articles (see n. 16 above) or in legal practice. 
152  See The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, op. cit. n. 148, Part D and in par-
ticular at § D.2. 
153  See, e.g., BAE plc, Art. 105(B). 
154  See the guidance issued by the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators in 
1996, drafted by a working party of the Institute supported by the Department of Trade and 
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regulation in the United Kingdom is really not at all wide. Narrower still is the 
divergence between Article 9 and current practice here. 
One difference between the Directive and current law in the United Kingdom 
concerns the rights of proxies. Articles 9 and 10(3) of the Directive, read together, 
will give proxy holders the right to ask a question to the same extent as their 
respective appointors. Proxy holders have no such legal right at the moment in 
relation to a public (and therefore in relation to a listed) company, though these 
companies can and already do provide for such rights through specific articles of 
association.155 Even this difference will be eliminated, however, when proxy 
holders, as a matter of law, become entitled to speak at general meetings for 
which they are appointed.156 
Another difference between Article 9 and current law in the United Kingdom, 
but again a difference with much less substance than might first be thought, is that 
Article 9(2) will compel listed companies to respond to questions, while there is 
no such corresponding general right at present in the United Kingdom. Yet it is 
very strongly arguable that were the chairman of a meeting simply to allow a 
company, through its directors, to refuse to answer legitimate questions, he would 
be in breach of his fiduciary duties: his powers to direct the meeting are fiduciary 
powers and to be exercised so as to facilitate the business of the meeting.157 
Equally, a director who unreasonably refused to answer a question from a 
member could well find himself in breach of his basic duty to act in good faith in 
the best interests of the company,158 and possibly in breach of his duties of care 
and skill as well.159 And all this is quite aside from the clear obligations on 
directors under The Combined Code on Corporate Governance.160 
The UK Department of Trade and Industry did consult several years ago about 
the introduction of a generalised right for shareholders to ask questions at a 
meeting, though it did not suggest any general right to an answer.161 After 
consultation, the DTI decided against any change to the present law. Indeed, its 
—————————————————— 
Industry: ‘A Guide to Best Practice for Annual General Meetings’, particularly at § 2.6. The 
guide is available at: <http://www.icsa.org.uk/images/pdf/agm_guide.pdf>. 
155  See n. 139 above and its accompanying text. 
156  See clause 331 of the Companies Bill. 
157  Consider, e.g., the principles articulated in Byng v. London Life [1990] Ch. 170. 
158  As to the basic duty, see, e.g., Regentcrest plc v. Cohen [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 81 at [121]-
[123], per Jonathan Parker J. For the future, see clause 173 of the Companies Bill. 
159  As to the basic duty, see, e.g., Re Barings plc (No. 5) [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 433 at pp. 486-
489, per Jonathan Parker J (approved, in so far as raised for its decision, by the Court of 
Appeal, [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 523 at pp. 534-535). For the future, see clause 175 of the Companies 
Bill. 
160  Again, see The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, op. cit. n. 148, Part D and in 
particular at § D.2. 
161  The Department of Trade and Industry, Shareholder Communications at the Annual 
General Meeting (London, 1996). 
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proposals would not have advanced shareholders’ rights to ask pertinent questions 
beyond the present law. More importantly, the DTI recognised that such rights 
could undermine the authority of the chairman at a general meeting to bring a 
debate to a sensible conclusion if the rights were too broadly stated. They could 
therefore make such meetings unmanageable. Indeed, the main criticism of 
Article 9 is just that: it is not clear that the rights of issuers under Article 9(2) to 
ensure ‘good order’ at meetings of shareholders would allow the issuer, through 
the meeting’s chairman, to prevent debate meandering on uselessly ad nauseam. 
Some redrafting of Article 9(2) is in order. 
In short, the differences between Article 9 of the Directive and existing law in 
Britain are not at all great. The main difference is the overly broad scope of the 
right proposed in Article 9. That is indeed a cause for concern. 
 
6.2.2 Article 12 
 
The next part of the Directive for comment is Article 12. This allows for postal 
and electronic voting by the shareholders of a listed company in advance of a 
general meeting. Currently this is not practically possible in Britain. Admittedly, 
there is no bar in principle to postal or electronic voting in advance of a com-
pany’s general meeting, provided that the company’s articles of association made 
appropriate express provision.162 (The possibility of voting in absentia would not 
be an implied term of a company’s articles.163.) However, as noted earlier, the 
definitions of ‘special’ and ‘extraordinary’ resolutions make it practically 
impossible to provide for voting in absentia:164 special resolutions are very often 
put to a general meeting, and in order to pass the resolution, voting in person or 
by proxy is necessary. It is odd, therefore, that this inflexibility in the law will be 
entrenched by the Companies Bill.165 If Article 12 is adopted in due course, the 
Bill – most likely by then an Act of Parliament – will need alteration within a 
very short time. This is obviously unsatisfactory. 
Still, the need for Article 12 is far from clear. Exactly the same practical result 
– a vote cast by a shareholder in absentia – can be achieved through the share-
holder giving a proxy for the meeting in question, either by post or electronically. 
Article 12 does seem to involve changing the law to no practical purpose. Indeed, 
proxies have some advantages to a vote cast directly by post or electronically. A 
shareholder who gives a proxy can change his mind by one of two means, 
whereas a vote once cast cannot be revoked. The shareholder can revoke his 
proxy at any time before the meeting, or before the effective time for revocations 
—————————————————— 
162  See n. 24 above. 
163  See Harben v. Phillips (1883) 23 Ch.D. 14. 
164  See the text accompanying n. 24 and following. 
165  Companies Bill, clauses 288-290, defining how members may take decisions. 
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stipulated by the articles of the company in question (often forty-eight hours 
before the relevant meeting).166 He can then give another proxy, assuming there is 
still time to do so. Alternatively, the shareholder can turn up and vote at the 
meeting, and his vote will count to the exclusion of any vote cast by the proxy 
holder.167 
 
6.2.3 Article 15 
 
Finally there is Article 15, which provides for the publication on a listed com-
pany’s website of the votes cast on resolutions put to the company’s general 
meeting. This is already very common practice, though not an obligation.168 The 
Companies Bill will impose such an obligation, however, whether or not the 
Directive is adopted, though the Bill will have to be amended to require the 
publication of the percentage vote for and against each resolution.169 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Directive is, in its current form, entirely consistent with the established model 
of internal governance structures in British companies. It does not restrict the 
basically contractual model of shareholder governance, but simply subjects the 
shareholders’ arrangements to certain regulatory standards. In its approach, it is 
consistent with a century and a half of regulation in the United Kingdom. This is 
welcome. The system for internal governance arrangements adopted in the United 
Kingdom has proved remarkably resilient over the years. It has provided the 
space within which many innovative developments can occur: it provides an 
open, flexible structure within which the inventiveness and drive of the private 
sector can set to work and establish institutional arrangements within companies 
to suit their respective circumstances. 
The Directive is also quite light-touch. It does not place too many demands on 
companies which they are ill-suited to satisfy. So long as the United Kingdom 
implements it in a satisfactory manner, the Directive should not prove unduly 
burdensome to business. Indeed, most of what it will require is already either the 
—————————————————— 
166  See n. 76 above. 
167  The shareholder’s vote impliedly revokes the proxy: Knight v. Buckley (1859) 5 Jur. 
(N.S.) 817; Cousins v. International Brick Co. Ltd. [1931] 2 Ch. 90. (The proxy holder is, after 
all, simply the agent, usually the agent at will, of the shareholder: Re English, Scottish & 
Australian Bank Ltd. [1893] 3 Ch. 385.) In the author’s experience, this implication is never 
contradicted by any express term of a company’s articles of association. 
168  See, e.g., <http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9007321&contentId= 
7015251>. 
169  Companies Bill, clause 348. 
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law in Britain, or at least best practice. The exception to this is Article 9 (the right 
to ask questions). It is questionable whether this single, generalised right is 
needed in the United Kingdom, given the existing situation which results from 
interaction of the common law, statute and regulation (.principally the Listing 
Rules). Article 9 does have the potential to make company general meetings 
unwieldy, to say the least. 
The main concern for the future is that the UK government, fearful of poten-
tial liability under the Francovich principle for failing (or failing adequately) to 
implement the Directive,170 may just enact the Directive as an additional layer of 
regulation on British listed companies, without integrating it into existing UK 
law, or, where appropriate, taking no action because UK law is already compliant 
with the Directive. The potential for confusion in such a course of action is 
obvious, as is the extra burden of complying with several layers of existing and 
new regulation which, quite unintentionally, may not match together perfectly. 
That, however, is a matter for Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. 
It is not the fault, if fault there be, of the Directive and the Community institutions 
which sponsored it. 
—————————————————— 
170  ECJ, Case C-6/90 Francovich v. Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
